



RESEARCH IN THE AGE
OF SCIENCE II
Karl H. MÜLLER
Wiener Institute for Social Science Documentation
and Methodology (WISDOM), Wien
Niko TOŠ




Primljeno: 29. 11. 2010.
This article deals with a rapid change which is currently sweeping
through the science landscapes and discusses the far-reaching
implications of this structural break for the social sciences and for
survey research in particular. More specifically, this article will
make three central claims. First, the science system as a whole is
presently undergoing a significant phase transition which can be
summarized as a shift from Science I to Science II. Second, due
to these large-scale changes, new cognitive environments are
gradually emerging as the background knowledge of survey
research which will exert a profound impact on its future
practices. Third, these new cognitive environments will lead to
new actor models and to new bridges between survey research
and the cognitive neurosciences on the one hand and
biomedical research on the other hand.
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The present article starts from a bird's eye view on scientific
landscapes and on their evolution in the very long run. From
this macro-scientific perspective of the très longue durée it can315
 
be observed that a deep structural change is currently taking
place which affects the disciplinary matrices (Kuhn, 1973, 1977)
as well as the cognitive co-operation potentials of practically
all major disciplines across the natural, social and technical
sciences.1 Quite naturally, such a comprehensive phase tran-
sition should exert a deep impact on the social sciences and
on their boundaries or links with neighbouring or seemingly
distant academic fields. In particular, the relevant backgro-
und knowledge for the social sciences in general or for special
areas like survey research in particular should be changing
significantly. In the subsequent sections of this article some of
the implications of this on-going metamorphosis in the science
landscapes for the area of survey research will be outlined in
greater detail. As its central claim, the article suggests that the
current changes in the background knowledge of survey re-
search should have a strong influence in re-shaping and re-
-inventing survey research significantly.
FROM SCIENCE I TO SCIENCE II
Within the last decades, the science system as a whole has
entered a phase of radical transformations from an old re-
gime, called Science I, to a new regime under the name of
Science II.2 This general change will lead to profound chan-
ges in the theoretical and epistemological background know-
ledge for the social sciences in general and for survey research
in particular.3
Table 1 captures some of the important shifts from the tra-
ditional cognitive organizations of science which were charac-
teristic of the scientific method from the 16th and 17th cen-
turies onward to its new rules of operation and to the new
model and theory structures which emerged rapidly since
the 1950s.
Dimensions Science I Science II
Leading Fields of Science Classical Physics Evolutionary Biology and
the Sciences of Complexity
Theoretical Goals General, Universal Laws Pattern Formation and
Pattern Recognition
Theoretical Perspectives Axiomatic, Reductionistic Nested and Embedded Processes
Leading Metaphors Clocks Clouds
Core Philosophers Rene Descartes (Cogito) LudwigWittgenstein (Cogitamus)
Epistemology Observer Excluded Observer Included
Ontology Dualism Monism, Self-Organization
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Dimensions Science I Science II
Generative Mechanisms Trivial Mechanisms Non-Trivial Mechanisms
Forecasting Capabilities High Low
Complexity Low High
Perspectives on Change Linear, Equilibrium Non-Linear, far from Equilibrium
Distributions Emphasis on Mild Distributions Emphasis onWild Distributions
Potential for Inter- Low High
Disciplinary Research
Cognitive Distances High Medium/Small
between the Social
Sciences and the Lea-
ding Field of Science
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
FOR SURVEY RESEARCH IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE II
Before entering into content issues, the concept of a back-
ground knowledge (BK) for a scientific discipline SDi must be
introduced in a clear and accessible manner. In a general way,
the theoretical, epistemological and methodological back-
ground knowledge for a scientific discipline SDi is composed
of building blocks from three different domains.
• The first class of background knowledge elements (BKI) for
a scientific discipline SDi or field of analysis is based on
those disciplines that can be assumed to constitute or
form the basis of SDi. With respect to the social sciences
or the particular field of survey research, the cognitive
neurosciences (CNS) can be seen as the constitutive back-
ground knowledge area for the social sciences or, more
specifically, for survey research. Here, the model and the-
ory structures of CNS, its prevalent epistemologies and
its dominant methodologies are all included in the BKI-
-group for the social sciences or for survey research.
• The second set of BK-building blocks (BKII) comes from
the leading field (LDt) at a given time t, the theory struc-
tures of LDt, its dominant epistemologies and its general
methodologies. Thus, the life-sciences and their mode of
operations4 constitute the second BKII-group for the so-
cial sciences or for survey research.
• The third and final group of background-knowledge buil-
ding blocks (BKIII) is transdisciplinary in nature and ap-317
plies to all scientific disciplines, including the leading dis-
cipline as well. Paradigmatically, the third BK-group is
composed of a semantic network with universal catego-
ries like space, time, matter, energy or information, of a
system of constants across the natural and social worlds,
of basic logical and numerical calculi and of general rules
for scientific operations across all relevant scientific disci-
plines.
In the days of Science I with theoretical physics as the lea-
ding scientific field, the search for universal laws or a reduc-
tionist view of theory structures with theoretical physics as its
basis were typical elements of the theoretical background know-
ledge for the social sciences in general or for survey research
in particular. Likewise, epistemological or methodological ru-
les, associated with theoretical physics like objectivity, scien-
tific realism or the covering lawmodel of explanations became
characteristic building blocks for the background-knowledge
of the social sciences.
Currently, we live amidst the diffusion of Science II, with
the life sciences as the leading field and with its correspond-
ing epistemologies or methodologies. In the context of Sci-
ence II the theoretical, epistemological andmethodological back-
ground-knowledge for scientific disciplines outside the lead-
ing field of the life sciences is undergoing significant changes,
too. In a single catch-phrase, the transitions in background
knowledge can be summarized as a shift from a vertically groun-
ding background knowledge to a horizontally embedding one
or, in line with Table 1, from a hierarchically structured back-
ground knowledge to a heterarchical one (Müller, 2011).
At this point, the article will be focused on those changes
in the background knowledge which are of particular rele-
vance for survey research. In a nutshell, at least seven build-
ing blocks can be identified both from the area of the life sci-
ences (BKII) and from the embedding domains of the neuro-
-cognitive sciences (BKI) which should exert a strong influence
on the future forms of models, methods and instrument con-
structions in survey research. As will be shown later on in
more detail, the new background knowledge should have su-
stainable effects on internal, non-trivial actor models which
should replace the current trivial versions, on more complex
external actor models and their interactions with their envi-
ronments as well as on the links between survey research and
the biomedical sciences. Table 2 as well as Figure 1 summarize
those changes in background knowledge that should exert a
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Science I
Domains of Back- [Theoretical Physics Science II
ground Knowledge as Leading Discipline (LD)] [Life Sciences as LD]
Objects of Objects Living Systems
Investigation Simple Action Schemes Embedded Cognition
Cognitive Isolationism Cognitive Holism
Single Account Sufficient Requisite Variety Necessary
Subjects of Investigation Observer Exclusion Observer Inclusion
Interactions Sequential, Linear Recursive, Non-Linear
(between Subjects Equilibrium Eigenforms
and Objects) Dyadic, Asymmetric Triadic, Symmetric
Forms Configurations
As can be seen both from Figure 1 and from Table 2, the
main differences between the old and the new background
knowledge cover the entire domain of analyses, namely the
subjects of investigation, the objects of analysis and, finally,
the interaction modes between subjects and objects of analy-
sis. All three domains differ strongly between Science I and
Science II. In short, Science II has become a science of living
systems for living systems in which the subjects of analysis,
being living systems themselves, are an indispensable and in-
clusive part of an investigation. The objects of analysis, name-
ly living systems, turn out to be far more complex than the
physical objects within Science I. Finally, the interactions be-
tween subjects and objects are organized, as will be shown la-















The methodological and theoretical elements of the new
background knowledge emerge predominantly from the em-
bedding area for the social sciences, namely from the cogni-
tive neurosciences whereas the new epistemological compo-
nents come from a diverse group of frameworks which are par-
ticularly focused on the specificities of living systems like the
approaches by Robert Rosen (2005) and Walter M. Elsasser
(1998), radical constructivism or, as specially relevant subsets
of radical constructivism,5 second-order cybernetics (esp. Foer-
ster, 2003) and the autopoietic approach (Maturana, 1985a;
Maturana and Varela, 1987). These and similar perspectives
are especially relevant for shaping the core epistemologies of
Science II research.6 From both sides, the theoretical-metho-
dological and the epistemological one, the conventional wis-
dom of survey research is not only questioned in its core as-
pects and in its central designs (see, for example, Palombo,
1999; Ryckman, 2000), but survey research is also very much
encouraged to change its traditional perspectives in order to
become compatible with the new Science II landscapes.
SEVEN NEW COMPONENTS IN THE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
FOR SURVEY RESEARCH IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE II
Following Figure 1 and Table 2, the first distinctive feature be-
tween the background knowledge BKI-II of Science I and Science
II lies in the units of analysis and has been captured by the
dichotomy of objects (Science I) and living systems (Science
II). As it turns out, living systems, as the main actors on the
stage of Science II, are structured and organized in a signifi-
cantly different way than the physical objects in the phase of
Science I. Living systems can be characterized by attributes
like autonomy, internal state-determination, multi-level orga-
nization, learning and the like. The most important differen-
ces to the objects under Science I lie, however, in the relations
between a researcher and her or his domain of investigation.
Under Science I, objects and researchers were situated in dif-
ferent ontological domains whereas under Science II, the re-
searcher her- or himself is a living system, too, and can be des-
cribed with categories like autonomy, internal state-determi-
nation, multi-level organization, learning and the like. This
point has far-reaching implications, some of which will be de-
alt with under the notion of observer inclusion (See, once a-
gain, Figure 1).
Aside from an analytical distinction in terms of living
actors, a second new element in the theoretical background
knowledge BKI-II for survey research is related to the des-
cription of the environments of living systems which should
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ence I, physical objects could be studied as embedded in a phy-
sical environment and with directly observable interactions
between objects and their surroundings. Under Science II,
cognitive models and methodologies must follow more and
more along the pathways of embedded or situated cognition
(see esp. Adams and Aizawa, 2008; Bodenhausen and Lam-
bert, 2003; Gibbs, 2005; Noe, 2009 or Robbins and Aydede,
2008). This road towards embedded or situated cognition is so
important because it puts special emphasis on the distributed
nature of cognition, on thinking environments and why, fol-
lowing a well-known reversion by Humberto R. Maturana,
the mind is not the head (Maturana, 1985).
In situated cognition, a brain needs not only a senso-mo-
toric active organism, but also a responsive environment for
its own internal cognitive operations. In this view, the envi-
ronment becomes the necessary co-evolving counterpart for
individual actions and interactions. Table 3 exhibits some of
the characteristic differences between the two forms of environ-
ments in Science I and in Science II.
Environments in Science I Environments in Science II
Weak Boundaries Strong Boundaries
Direct Crossings Indirect Crossings
Cause – Effect Triadic Relations
Direct Environmental Effects Boundary Transformations,
Indirect Effects
External Dynamics Internal Dynamics
Adaptation Internal Complexity Drifts
Cognitive holism becomes the third new component of
the background knowledge BKI-II for survey research, but will
be introduced in more detail in the next section because the
building block of cognitive holism offers a new bridge from the
cognitive neurosciences to the inner side of actor models.
The fourth point of departure between the old and the
new background knowledge BKI-II moves away from the
descriptive requirements for living systems and their envi-
ronments or from the theoretical requirement of a holistic
organization of cognitive theories. Instead, the fourth point
emphasizes the importance of a requisite descriptive and data
variety. Under Science II, the focus shifts away from descrip-
tions and measurements at a single level to more general con-
figurations and, above all, to different levels of descriptive
and data variety. The study of living systems requires a mul-
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 TABLE 3
The Changing Roles of
Environments between
Science I and Science II
surements, ranging from the cellular and neural level, to
high-level brain measurements, up to the levels of internal or
external verbal accounts or the observations of acting and
interacting persons and transactional data in the case of hu-
man societies. All these different levels, measurement types and
data formats are needed in order to reach a fuller understan-
ding of living systems in their contexts or environments.
The most important challenge with respect to the requi-
site variety ofmeasurements and observationswill be to bridge
the currently deep gap between behavioral observations and
the level of the brain scans and neural measurements. But
Science II, in contrast to Science I, will generate a rich flow of
neural and brain data not only on different types of thought
processes, but on daily routines and practices as well. For
comparative survey research, this new stage of a requisite
descriptive data variety will bring about a dense stream of
neural patterns and data for the different stages in survey
interactions, which should allow tackling classical issues and
controversies like the one on non-attitudes or under-learned
responses in a fresh manner.
Fifth, aside from the requisite descriptive variety, anot-
her epistemological point of considerable relevance for Science
II research in general lies in the inclusion of observers or, al-
ternatively, of researchers in their research. Focused on sur-
vey research in particular, research designs will change more
and more from an exclusive to an inclusive mode, with social
researchers as an indispensable element in it.
In the world of Science I, mass, space and energy were
the fundamental building blocks for a science of objects. War-
ren McCulloch was probably the first to note the peculiarity
that breakthroughs in physics require the invention of surpri-
sing regularities or theorems of great abstraction which, how-
ever, are not included in the conceptual machinery for phy-
sical objects.
Let us now compel our physicist to account for himself as
a part of the physical world. In all fairness, he must stick
to his own rules and show in terms of mass, energy, space
and time how it comes about that he creates theoretical phy-
sics. (McCulloch, 1988, 73)
Thus, in Science II one is, by necessity, confronted with a
more inclusive task. Following, once again, McCulloch, a phy-
sicist
must then become a neurophysiologist …, but in so doing
he will be compelled to answer whether theoretical physics
is something which he can discuss in terms of neurophysi-
ology ... To answer 'no' is to remain a physicist undefiled.
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In other words, Science II is the era of living systems,
being researched by living systems. This new configuration
brings the observer or the researcher as a necessary compo-
nent back into her or his research domain. Thus, Science II be-
comes to a remarkable extent a self-referential and self-inclu-
sive form of science.
Sixth, another element of the new background knowledge
BKI-II for survey research lies in the closed organization of
relations into which living systems, the observing scientist
included, can and should enter. In Science II, the new mini-
mal configuration for the study of living or learning systems
by living systems is not a dyadic relation between subject and
object which has been characteristic of the conventional sci-
entific method, but is built in a triadic fashion, with the ob-
serving scientific researcher as one node, the domains under
observation as another node and with a final node linking
and closing these two nodes to a triadic ensemble. In short,
Science II research designs are to be built in their minimal form
not with one, not with two, but with three components.7
Science II, in contrast to Science I, will be characterized
more and more by designs and by operations in configura-
tions of a closed triadic nature which includes the observing
researcher R, the domain under observation which is usually
composed of observing living systems or, alternatively, of par-
ticipant observers PO. Additionally, R and PO are closed by
an inter-mediate element such as rule systems or theories
about the neural organization of PO and R which acts as a
generative mechanism GM between R and PO.
Characteristically, the types of relations in triadic config-
urations change from causal relations to generative relations.
Figure 2 as well as Table 4 highlight the significant differences
between the causal forms of Science I and the generative con-












Causal (A→ B) Generative [PO(A, B), LS, GM]*
Asymmetrical in time Symmetrical in time
Separation into cause and effect No causes and effects
Cause is necessary, sufficient or both Mutual dependence




*A, B: Events. PO: Observer. GM: Generative Mechanism. LS: Living
Systems as Field of Research.
Seventh, Table 4 already included the notion of necessary
Eigenforms, inherent in triadic and generative configura-
tions. Thus, the seventh ingredient of the new background
knowledge BKI-II emphasizes the production of Eigenforms.
This implies that the recursive interactions between resear-
chers and their living fields of investigation, if properly orga-
nized in a triadic fashion, lead to new stabilities or, to use an
expression by Heinz von Foerster, to Eigenforms. Eigenforms
become one of the central goals of research processes within
Science II.8
The remaining sections of this article will build three broad
bridges from survey research to the core domains of Science
II in general and to the cognitive neurosciences and to the
area of biomedical and health research in particular. These
three bridges should offer fresh incentives for pursuing and
intensifying new ways of survey research both for generating
data and for analyzing them.
BRIDGES FROM THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES TO
NEW COMPLEX INTERNAL ACTOR MODELS FOR SURVEY RESEARCH
Following the new focus on living systems and the notion of
embedded cognition, one of the basic differences between the
old and the new background knowledge lies in the complex
nature of cognitive processes of living systems. The study of
cognition under Science II departs more and more from the
pathways of conventional folk-psychology or from typical Sci-
ence I traditions like behaviorism.
One of the challenging general heuristic rules for the stu-
dy of cognitive processes called cognitive holism, was already
included in Figure 1 and was propagated strongly as early as
in 1969 by Heinz von Foerster (Foerster, 2003).
According to this rule, it is possible, in principle, to isolate




processes, for instance the faculty to perceive, the faculty to
remember,9 the faculty to infer or many other senso-cognitive
as well as cognitive-motoric faculties. However, one should
not expect that these conceptual separations between percep-
tion, memory or inference find a 1:1 correspondence in the ne-
ural organization of actors. In its generalized form, the principle
of cognitive holism can be formulated in the following way:
If one wishes to isolate these faculties functionally or locally,
one is doomed to fail. Consequently, if the mechanisms
that are responsible for any of these faculties are to be dis-
covered, then the totality of cognitive processesmust be con-
sidered … (Foerster and Müller, 2003, 29f.)10
The inseparability of these faculties can be shown by a
reduction ad absurdum. It can be demonstrated that the as-
sumption of independent faculties in isolation leads to ab-
surd consequences. In particular, it can be demonstrated that,
if one of these faculties mentioned above is omitted, the en-
tire system is devoid of cognition.
Phrased differently, actor models with one of the above
faculties like actor models with memory only turn out strik-
ingly incomplete because a variety of additional internal fac-
ulties are required in order to account for the capacity to me-
morize. Thus, cognitive holism poses a very big challenge for
the development of new internal actor models. But once actor
models that correspond to the principle of cognitive holism
are available, a new bridge is opened up between survey
research in general and between the interactions of respon-
dents and interviewers in particular. As has already been de-
monstrated (Müller and Toš, 2009), these new interaction
models, based, for example, on genetic algorithms, can offer
profound new insights on the nature of survey questions and
on several fallacies which result from a traditional folk-psycho-
logy view on domains like values or self-evaluations.
In particular, fully developed internal actor models could
lead to a new typology of survey questions which is based on
the cognitive production type of survey responses. In order
to separate survey items into various groups, a new dimen-
sion can be introduced that refers to two different types of
cognitive response productions, which have been labeled as
over-learned and under-learned responses (Müller and Toš,
2009). Over-learned responses can be considered as relatively
stable, constant and insensitive to different contexts or pre-hi-
stories of actors. Under-learned responses are, by necessity,
creative, highly volatile, instable and sensitive to contexts or
pre-histories. This distinction varies from one person to the
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tors as a whole. Table 5 offers some further hints on the dif-
ferences between these two types of responses. Probably the
most important element of this distinction between over-learned
and under-learned responses lies in the fact that under-learned
responses are quickly forgotten and play no relevant role in
the overall cognitive organization of actors.
In the spirit of cognitive holism, over-learned responses
can be considered as a permanent and stable component of
the overall cognitive repertoire of actors and under-learned
responses as just-in-time reactions to a particular communica-
tive interaction. Under-learned responses become a typical by-
-product of a communicative interaction and bear no or very
little relevance for recurrent practices or for other relevant pre-
ferences of actors.
Dimensions Over-Learned Responses Under-Learned Responses
Response Single Response Multiple Responses Possible
Response across Time Stable across Time Highly Volatile, Unstable
Inputs No Sensitivity to Highly Selective/Sensitive of
Question Inputs Question Inputs
Memory Long-Term Memory Short-Term Memory
Production Recall Just in Time Productions




Consistency Global Consistency Global, Local Inconsistencies
Errors by Errors by Respondents No Error by Respondents
Respondents Possible Possible
Bias No Biases Multiple Biases
Complexity Trivial Configuration Non-Trivial Configuration
One can introduce a second dimension with respect to
different forms of observation, which becomes relevant for
survey items. Along this second dimension, survey items can
be differentiated between externally observable domains like
recurrent practices which can be observed in principle by third
parties and internal domains like assessments which rely pre-
dominantly on the respondents' answers alone. Survey items
with externally observable domains can be validated with the
help of other observational data whereas items with only












It becomes highly interesting to arrange these two do-
mains of cognitive response production and the two different
types of observational domains. Table 6 presents such a ma-
trix with four different groups of survey items.
Externally Observable Domains Internal Domains
(Recurrent Practices, (Assessments, Attitudes,
Knowledge-Items, etc.) Fictional Stories, etc.)
Over-Learned Responses Group I Group II
Under-Learned Responses Group III Group IV
Due to the differentiations in Table 6, the interpretation of
these-four groups of survey items should andmust differ rad-
ically from one another.
• Group I-items can be interpreted at face-value and can
be compared and checked with other external data as
well with respect to measurement errors or biases. Items
on the daily time from home to work, on information
activities, on the voting behaviour or on knowledge-items
fall under the first category. Unfortunately however, Gro-
up I-items are not the most common ones in surveys and
are rather restricted to the socio-demographic section of
surveys only.
• Group II-items, due to an internal cognitive production
process only, cannot be linked with comparable external
data sets, but may have similar data in the past or from
other regions. Group II-items are also strongly connected
with the long-term cognitive repertoire of actors, which
manifests itself in these stable and context-independent
responses. Most importantly, several additional items are
usually needed to determine a Group II-membership of
a particular item, otherwise a Group II-item becomes un-
identifiable. While specific preferences or assessments
might qualify as a Group II-item, Group II-items cannot
be interpreted in terms of recurrent practices but must be
understood as stable fixed-points in the cognitive do-
main of actors only.
• Group III-items are composed of externally observable
survey questions which contain an unusual component
like a particular scaling device. For example, asking for
daily TV-consumption in terms of minutes requires a cre-
ative reaction and, thus, an under-learned response. U-
sually, Group III-items are characterized by weak links to
recurrent practices, although additional external infor-327
 TABLE 6
A 2 x 2 Matrix
of Survey-Items
mation on TV-consumption patterns for various TV-net-
works would be needed for any substantial interpreta-
tion. For Group III-items, additional external information
is necessarily required in order to transform the weak
links to recurrent practices into stronger ties.
• At first sight, Group IV-items look similar to the other three
groups although these items are fundamentally different
form the rest of the groups. Responses to these items are
produced just in time, are forgotten almost instantly and,
moreover, highly volatile and unstable within respon-
dents. Trust in national or European institutions on a ten
point scale can be considered as a paradigmatic example
for a Group IV-item. In terms of interpretation,Group IV-re-
sponses offer no hints on recurrent practices and need,
additionally, a large amount of similar cross-regional and
inter-temporal data in order to identify a relevant expla-
nandum at all. Persistent differences across and within
countries on the trust in institutions-item, for example,
makes it worthwhile to search for relevant external data
on recurrent practices which are relevant for trust-issues.
In a strong sense, Group IV-items by themselves are void
of interpretative content.
This short typology of survey-items, based on a holistic
cognitive actor model, makes three very clear points on the
current distances between survey items and recurrent socie-
tal practices.
• First, relatively few survey-items, namely Group I-items
only, allow a direct interpretation in terms of recurrent
societal practices. Moreover, Group I-items can be ana-
lysed further with respect to significant differences in
terms of class or stratification, gender differences or age
groups.
• Second, Group II and Group III-items require a substan-
tial amount of additional internal and especially external
data in order to become interpretable at all. In combina-
tion with large external or internal data, these items can
be interpreted at least in terms of weak ties to recurrent
practices or the cognitive organization of respondents.
• Third, Group IV-items need an enormous amount of
additional internal as well as external data in order to
close the gap to observable recurrent societal routines at
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The upshot of the typology of survey-responses lies in
the observation that only a few items in traditional surveys
can be interpreted directly with the help of statistical analy-
ses. The majority of survey items, especially Group IV-items,
need a large amount of additional external as well as internal
data in order to be interpretable at all. However, surveys are
usually interpreted as if they were composed of Group I-items
only. In other words, by relying on surveys and the established
forms of interpretation, a researcher positions her- or himself in
relatively large distances to recurrent societal practices which,
after all, were the target domain for surveys in the first place.
BRIDGES FROM THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES
TO NEW EXTERNAL ACTOR MODELS
The second bridge is situated in the domain of actor-environ-
ment coupling and crosses the great divide between survey
research and the fields of the cognitive neurosciences (Gaz-
zaniga et al., 2004). The second bridge is built with the help of
a well-known principle in the cognitive neurosciences which
has been labeled as the principle of undifferentiated encod-
ings PUE). PUE was postulated already by Johannes P. Müller
in 1826 and has been put forward in recent decades again and
again by Heinz von Foerster (e.g., Foerster, 2003) or Ernst von
Glasersfeld (Glasersfeld, 1997). In order to describe PUE at
greater length, it can be divided into three parts.
• Undifferentiated Signaling: The first part concerns the
sensory border between actors and their environments
and asserts that only undifferentiated quantities at dif-
ferent levels of intensities, but not qualitatively differen-
tiated signals, cross the border between the external and
the internal worlds of actors. Thus, sensory inputs enter
as undifferentiated quantities and not as differentiated
qualities.
The response of a nerve cell does not encode the phy-
sical nature of the agents that caused its response. En-
coded is only 'howmuch' …, but not 'what' (von Foerster,
2003, 215).
• Discrete Signaling: The second PUE-part stresses the fact
that the quantities are not encoded in a continuous fash-
ion, but in a discrete manner.
• Signal Integration: Finally, the third PUE-element empha-
sizes the necessity for an overall integration of sensory
inputs into an overall pattern or result.
At first sight there are no family resemblances in view
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coding within the cognitive neurosciences to conventional
survey research. Upon second thought however, the follow-
ing methodological links can be identified which help to cross
the distance between PUE in the cognitive neuroscience do-
mains on the one hand and survey research on the other
hand.
Due to PUE and the emphasis on undifferentiated sig-
naling, a strong support can be offered for the functional
equivalence of different dimensions within an identical broa-
der survey domain. Surveys, by necessity, are capable of se-
lecting only a small fraction of the daily routines and of their
impact on the preferences and evaluations of individuals.
Likewise, surveys are capable of identifying individual cop-
ing capacities in a highly selective manner, too. Thus, a single
survey offers a highly selective minimal model of situated
cognition (Robbins and Aydede, 2008; Piatelli-Palmarini, 1994;
Pohl, 2004) which covers a small fraction of the overall stream
of routines and of the cognitive evaluation patterns of actors.
PUE could and should open new bridges especially for a
secondary analysis of seemingly incomparable data-sets
which are characterized by different dimensions within an
identical common domain. Here, PUE can be used to treat dif-
ferent dimensions within a commonly shared domain as e-
quivalent.With discrete signaling one can build a discrete quan-
titative scale for qualitatively different inputs. And signal in-
tegration can be transformed into a special algorithm for all
the aggregation of selected survey dimensions.
Table 7 offers an example for two common survey do-
mains in Survey A and Survey B11 with different dimensions
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 FIGURE 3




Survey A Survey B
Common Domain I: Working Conditions
Allowed to be flexible in working hours Allowed to decide how daily work is organized
Allowed to influence job environment Allowed to influence decisions about work direction
Allowed to change work tasks Get a similar or better job with another employer
Start own business Satisfaction with the way things are handled at
workplace
Common Domain II: Resources
Household's total net income, all sources Highest level of education
Borrowmoney to make ends meet, Feeling about household's income nowadays
difficult or easy
Life satisfaction Happiness
Father's highest level of education Mother's highest level of education
Both surveys offer a functionally equivalent account of
the overall neuro-cognitive pattern of undifferentiated enco-
dings, discrete signaling and the signal integration between
the cognitive-neural organization of actors and their socio-eco-
nomic environments.
Due to the rich availability of different dimensions with-
in a set of common domains, one could produce new, but i-
dentically generated group formations which can be used for
comparative analysis, despite significant differences in the
underlying dimensions. Due to PUE, these constructs can be
considered as equivalent in terms of their overall neuro-cog-
nitive repercussions and implications. Thus, through the PUE-
-bridge a large number of new designs for secondary analy-
ses should be opened up because one can use different di-
mensions in surveys that share a set of common domains and
aggregate them in an identical manner (see Bischof et al., 2009).
NEW BRIDGES FROM SURVEY RESEARCH
TO THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES
The third new bridge leads from designs for survey analysis
to the areas of biomedical and health research. Through this
bridge one can move from various domains of vertical socio-
-economic dimensions, from socio-economic inequalities as well
as the self-reported health status to a deeper language level
and to a homogeneous vocabulary of stressors and of neuro-
-immunological processes.
Initially, it is useful to start with a taxonomy of different
types of stressors which can be found within the relevant bo-
dy of literature (see, for example, Cooper, 1996; Horwitz and
Scheid, 1999, or Sarafino, 2002). Here, one is confronted with331
 TABLE 7
PUE-Equivalent Item
Batteries in Survey A
and Survey B
a heterogeneous set, comprised of sensory stressors (strong
light, noise, sensory deprivation, etc.), block-stressors (preven-
ting essential routines like eating, sleeping, social contacts, etc.),
achievement stressors (tests, examinations, work-tasks, but
also monotony at work, etc.), social stressors (large crowd of
people, loneliness, isolation, etc.), environmental stressors (no-
ise, pollution, toxic materials, etc.), decision-based stressors
(goal conflicts, quick decisions, but also lack of decision-making,
etc.) or future-based stressors (fear, anxiety of the future, etc.).
Seemingly, the heterogeneity of stressors is accompanied
by a heterogeneity of stress reactions which vary in time (mi-
nutes, hours, days, weeks …), in intensity or in emotions, as-
sociated with each stress reaction. Nevertheless, common to
all these stress reactions is an attempt to reduce the discrep-
ancy between the effects of stressors and internal target val-
ues. Moreover, all stress reactions involve the activation of the
hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis and produce compara-
tively high quantities of endocrine hormones, particularly cor-
ticosteroids, with cortisol as the most important one, and ca-
techolamines. Likewise, all physiological reactions to stressma-
nifest themselves in a broad range of measurable changes like
a higher production of stress hormones, higher degrees of
blood pressure, heart rate, respiration rate, galvanic skin res-
ponses or, in larger amounts, of free fat acids.
The general pattern of stress responses possesses at least
two main connections to the domain of sickness and ailments,
namely through their direct effects on the cardiovascular sy-
stem on the one hand, and through their immediate impact
on the immune system on the other hand.
With the short background on stress-research, it appears
plausible to create a bridge from survey research to special
classes of stressors like social, environmental, future-based or
decision-based stressors. In order to move along this bridge,
one needs a special subset of survey dimensions which are
linked to societal inequality. In particular, the lower segments
of dimensions like degree of education, income, but also wor-
king conditions, work autonomy or environmental constraints
like pollution or traffic noise can be seen as external determi-
nants of societal inequalities. From this perspective, the follo-
wing subset-relation can be put forward:
Lower Segments SL of Dimensions
of Societal Inequalities ⊂ Stressors
It is quite obvious that this subset-relationship needs a
very detailed justification which cannot be provided within
the framework of the present article. However, five main ar-
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sibility for a sub-set relation between SL, the lowest decile, low-
est quarter up to the lower third in the different dimensions
of societal inequalities and stressors.
• First, SL–positions, which can be specified in a wide ar-
ray of living and working conditions, are characterized,
inter alia, by their relative permanence. Thus, many of
the SL–parts of socio-economic inequality dimensions like
low, insufficient or deteriorating incomes or low degrees
of qualifications are to be classified as long-lasting or, like
in the case of low qualifications, as (nearly) permanent.
Thus, being positioned in the SL–parts normally acts as a
continuous stressor and not as a single, rare or isolated
occurrence.
• Second, there exists a remarkable symmetry between the
language of societal inequality, in particular the focus on
the lower parts of a distribution on the one hand and the
physiological stress language on the other hand. In both
cases, no equivalences can be found for the upper side of
the inequality dimensions. Feeling unsafe in the public
sphere does have a corollary in terms of stressors. But fee-
ling very safe in the public domain does not constitute an
alternative source for stressors. Likewise, a noisy envi-
ronment at the workplace or at home implies at the same
time an environmental stressor whereas a quiet atmos-
phere at work or at home cannot be associated with a dif-
ferent group of stressors. Thus, the lower segments of the
distribution of inequality dimensions can be linked to stres-
sors, whereas upper segments in the distribution imply,
by and large, the absence of stressors.
• Third, the distribution-dependent specification for thres-
holds for the SL–parts provides additional support for
the subset relationship between the SL–areas of dimen-
sions of societal inequality and stressors. Since the major-
ity of the population is, by definitional necessity, above
the SL–threshold, individual actors, falling in a specific
SL–part, perceive themselves usually relatively deprived.
Thus, the available literature on the importance of rela-
tive deprivation (Olson and Hafer, 1996 or Walker and
Pettigrew, 1984) can be added as further evidence for the
proposed SL–part-stress linkages.
• Fourth, while stress reactions vary in length, intensity
and emotional involvement, the basic physiological reac-
tion patterns are unspecific with respect to the sources of
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reaction", confined to a specific region in the neuro-im-
mune system in contrast to a "loud noise-stress reaction",
affecting other parts of the neuro-immune system. Thus,
a multi-dimensional array of essential living conditions
across the contexts or settings of actors and across their
cognitive-emotional organization can be interpreted as a
summary of all relevant potential stressors whose scope
and degree of completeness is limited by the restrictions
inherent in conventional survey research only.
• Fifth, stressors and stress reaction are clearly not invari-
ant to the actual number of stressors since stress reac-
tions are functionally related, probably in a complex and
non-linear manner, to the overall number of stressors.
This, in turn, provides additional support why a survey
analysis should focus on the aggregation of dimensions
because these aggregate values should be interpretable
in terms of a net value for the overall number of socio-eco-
nomic stressors.
In this way, a third bridge can be built which leads from
survey research to biomedical and health research and back
and which should lead to a much deeper understanding of
the complex interactions between daily routines at the work-
place or at home and on patterns of health conditions.
FURTHER OUTLOOKS
At this point, the question arises whether these three bridges
from the neuro-cognitive sciences to survey research should
be viewed as artificial constructs with zero consequences, as a
happy coincidence or as a preliminary set of successful exam-
ples with many more to come. Towards the end of this article
two strong arguments can be put forward that one should be
able to identify many more recombinations across survey
research, the neuro-cognitive sciences and the life sciences in
the future. These two basic arguments do not even depend
on the secular changes from Science I to Science II, but refer
to the underlying technological support systems and envi-
ronments.
• First, in a sharp contrast to the laboratories for most parts
of the 20th century, one can observe a revolution in
cyber-research infrastructures which started only in the
last two decades and which will provide, inter alia, a
huge potential for data-integration and model recombi-
nations across practically all scientific disciplines. The cy-
ber-research infrastructures, which are currently built a-
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from every point of the scientific landscapes. Thus, a
massive integrative support system is currently in con-
struction which, even in the case of a chronic under-uti-
lization, provides a permanent incentive to explore new
and inter- or transdisciplinary ways of data or theory in-
tegration.
• Second, one can also see an upward trajectory of the
information and communication technologies (ICT) from
its low levels of numerical operations to considerably higher
levels of complex task integrations. Along this path the
ICT-segment produces recombinant and increasingly
intelligent machines that move along the drift of cogni-
tive holism, which has been described in the fourth sec-
tion of this article. As a consequence, a rich class of ma-
chine-based, but cognitive-holistic actor models, which
can also be used as reference points for survey research,
will be developed in the near future.
And with this brief technological outlook, the current ar-
ticle on the impact of new building blocks in the background
knowledge for survey research can and will be concluded.
NOTES
1 On this phase transition from Science I to Science II across differ-
ent dimensions of the science landscape, see especially Hollings-
worth and Müller, 2008 as well as Hollingsworth et al., 2008 or 2010.
2 For a similar distinction betweenMode I andMode II see, for example,
Gibbons et al., 1994, Nowotny et al., 2001 or Nowotny, 1999 and 2005.
3 On a wider discussion of the ongoing transformations from Science
I to Science II, see especially Boyer, 2008, Mayntz, 2008, Nowotny,
2008 or Sornette, 2008. While Mode I and Mode II refer more to the
organizational changes in science, the differentiation between Sci-
ence I and Science II is more focused on the theoretical dynamics of
the overall science landscapes.
4 On characteristic differences between the operation rules in high e-
nergy physics andmolecular biology, see especially Knorr-Cetina, 1999.
5 On radical constructivism in general, see Watzlawick, 1981, Watz-
lawick and Krieg, 1991 or Schmidt, 1987 which paved the way for ra-
dical constructivism as a wider research tradition.
6 Second-order cybernetics has been developed explicitly by Heinz
von Foerster as a science of living systems for living systems. See espe-
cially Foerster, 2003, Müller and Müller, 2007 and Müller, 2008.
7 See also the paper from 1976 by Francisco J. Varela, where he moves
beyond the usual dualistic suspects of observer/observed, subject/
object, describer/described, operator/operand and the like (Varela, 1976).
8 Among the many variants of a theorem on the necessary emer-
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9 In principle, it would be possible to differentiate between a large
number of these faculties, like the faculty to infer, the faculty to
learn, the faculty to evaluate, the faculty to communicate or the fac-
ulty to move, to name just a few more additional faculties.
10 Aside from the functional and the local theses, one could put for-
ward two additional theses, one on genetic holism and one on epis-
temological holism as well. For more details, see Foerster andMüller,
2003.
11 Survey A and Survey B both use different items form the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS). This procedure was taken in order to de-
monstrate the comparability between these different dimensions
within a common domain. For more details, see Müller et al., 2010.
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Anketno istraživanje u novim kognitivnim
okruženjima drugoga doba znanosti
Karl H. MÜLLER
Bečki institut za dokumentaciju i metodologiju
društvenih znanosti, Beč
Niko TOŠ
Fakultet društvenih znanosti, Ljubljana
Članak se bavi brzim promjenama koje se trenutačno šire
područjem znanosti te raspravlja o dalekosežnim
posljedicama ovoga strukturnog prijeloma za društvene
znanosti i, posebno, za anketno istraživanje. Točnije, ovaj
članak izlaže tri osnovne tvrdnje. Prvo, cijeli se sustav
znanosti danas nalazi u važnoj prijelaznoj fazi koju možemo
sažeto nazvati pomakom od prvoga doba znanosti u drugo
doba. Drugo, zbog tih velikih promjena, postupno nastaju
nova kognitivna okruženja, koja će u svojstvu temeljnih
znanja o anketnom istraživanju duboko utjecati na buduću
praksu. Treće, ova nova kognitivna okruženja stvorit će nove
modele-sudionike i nove mostove između anketnog
istraživanja i kognitivnih neuroznanosti s jedne strane i
biomedicinskih istraživanja s druge.
Ključne riječi: dugoročna dinamika znanosti, kognitivne







MÜLLER, K. H., TOŠ, N.:
NEW COGNITIVE...
